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I. Introduction
Making the Single Market more dynamic has been identified as one of the top priorities to improve the EU's growth performance. 1 In contrast to manufacturing industries, where the Single Market appears to be working quite well 2 , an assessment by the European Commission 3 on the state of the internal market for services has identified a large gap between the vision of an integrated European economy and reality in service industries. There are still many impediments to the free movement of services in the EU. Particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises, the bulk of service providers, entry barriers in new EU markets are often prohibitive. With the Directive on Services in the Internal Market (SD) the European Parliament and the Council aim at removing the remaining barriers in this area to enable firms to exploit the full potential of cross-border services. This would be an important step forward in bringing the EU closer to its Lisbon targets.
Previous studies suggest sizeable macro-economic effects of the services directive in its original version (henceforth Draft Services Directive, (DSD 2004) . Kox et al. 4 econometrically estimate the implications of the SD for the cross-border provision of services; their results suggest that (in the service industries investigated) intra-EU trade would increase by some 44 percent and intra-EU FDI by some 26 percent. Copenhagen Economics 5 simulates the effects of the SD using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, assuming a reduction in tariff equivalents to the obstacles to cross-border provision of services (estimated in a first step). Their simulations suggest an increase in employment by around 600,000 persons and an increase in activity (value added) by some 1.1 percent.
This study supplements previous studies, using a simple econometric approach to estimate the economic effects of the SD through two channels: (i) the trade channel via the principle of "Free movement of services", and (ii) the FDI channel via the principle of "Freedom of Establishment for service providers". For both channels we deduce its implications for the macro-economic performance, i.e. for productivity, employment, value added, investment and GDP. According to our calculations the finally agreed upon version of the Services Directive (henceforth SD 2006) could raise employment by 400,000 in the EU-25 and increase real GDP by around one percent in the medium to long run.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II outlines the main transmission channels via which the SD is supposed to contribute to the Lisbon goal of more jobs and growth. Section III reports on previous studies by four European research groups on this topic. Section IV presents the own econometric estimates of the trade channel of the SD. Section V does the same for the FDI channel. In Section VI we evaluate the implications of the changes from DSD 2004 to SD 2006. The final Section VII summarises the results and outlines some policy conclusions.
II. The Services Directive and its Macro-economic Implications
Extending the (functioning of the) Single Market to service industries by implementing the four freedoms has no direct effects on growth and employment, but it is supposed to generate its effects mainly via an increase in trade, FDI and competition 6 . Figure 1 illustrates the main channels through which the Single Market may contribute indirectly to an improvement of macroeconomic performance. The abolishment of non-tariff barriers (reduction of administrative hurdles via implementing the SD 2006) 6 For a more detailed discussion of the transmission channels of the Single Market and the effects on macro-economic performance, see Griffith and Harrison (2004) , Nicodème and Sauner-Leroy (2004), and OECD (2003) .
Competition, in turn, increases productivity by bringing prices more in line with marginal costs, which reduces distortions of the price mechanism and enables a more efficient allocation of resources and higher productivity of the factors capital and labour (allocative efficiency); higher competitive pressure also increases the incentives for the management to organise work more efficiently and to reduce slack, as well as potential gains from exploiting increasing returns to scale as market size increases (productive efficiency). Finally, competition might also raise dynamic efficiency by increasing incentives for R&D activities and innovations and thereby boosting technological progress and growth of total factor productivity.
9 FDI is also supposed to lead to more productivity as well. This can be documented in particular in the transformation countries of Eastern Europe before they entered the EU.
An increase in competition will also reduce prices for two reasons: first, marginal costs go down as a result of higher productivity. Second, as a consequence of diminished market power, firms' mark-ups over marginal costs decrease as well. This reduction in prices increases the demand for services and thus also output. Whether the demand for production factors (employment and investment) ultimately increases, too, is a question that has to be answered empirically; it is conceivable that the growing demand for services can be met with a given (or even with a smaller) input of production factors as a result of the original increase in productivity.
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III. The Services Directive: Results of 4 Research Groups
Most studies on the effects of the Single Market focus on manufacturing, and here in turn often only on selected industries where strong effects of the Single Market were to be expected. To 9 Recently, it has been suggested that there might be an inverse U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation (Aghion et al., 2005) , i.e. there could be an optimal degree of competition between too little and too much competition. 10 In a recent paper, Nordhaus (2005) shows that -in contrast to widely held views -the increase in productivity in US manufacturing has rather mitigated than caused the large reduction in employment in manufacturing, whose primary cause turns out to be the increase in productivity and decline in prices of international competitors. (DSD 2004 ) as compared to the final version of the directive (SD 2006) .
(1) One of the first and most comprehensive studies -a first version already in 2004, the final version in 2005 -was that by Copenhagen Economics 12 . In a first step it made a survey on the administrative hurdles (regulatory barriers) hindering the full working of the single market for services along the lines of the documentation of administrative barriers carried out by the European Commission 13 . After translating these answers into an Internal Market Restrictiveness Index in Services (IMRIS) and aggregating it into seven sub indices (establishment, use of inputs, promotion, distribution, sales, after sales and non-legal) an econometric analysis studied two types of impact: rent creation and cost-creation. Both effects lead to higher prices, whereas the first results in higher profits and the latter in higher costs. Then these effects are converted into tariff equivalents and the consequences of the reduction of the IMRIS when implementing the DSD 2004 are simulated with a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (called GETEM) with imperfect competition covering all 25 EU Member States (EU-25). The most striking result that has received most attention is that the model predicts an economy-wide increase in employment by 0.3 percent that is 600,000 new jobs. Employment in services industries is predicted to go up by 0.5 percent and value added by 1.1 percent in the medium to the long run. Welfare (measured by private consumption) increases by € 37 billion or +0.6%. The elimination of the country of origin principle (CoOP) -estimated by Copenhagen Economics 14 in a special study for the UK government -would lower the effects by 10 percent. (3a) The core argument in the analysis of Kox et al. 16 is that it is not only the degree of regulation in service industries, but also the heterogeneity of regulations across EU countries that hampers the free movement of services within the EU. Overall heterogeneity indicator 31-38%
Source: Kox et al. (2004 Kox et al. ( /2005 Subsequently, Kox et al. estimate the effects of regulatory heterogeneity on bilateral intra-EU trade in services and intra-EU FDI in services. For trade, they use a gravity model, the standard approach to estimating trade potentials; for FDI, the gravity model is slightly modified in line with the knowledge-capital model 18 . The indices of regulatory heterogeneity are used as explanatory variables in both models; then the effects of the SD's implementation are simulated using the (significant) parameter estimates and the expected reduction of the respective indices. The sample comprises bilateral trade flows of the 14 old EU countries (Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated) for the years 1999-2001. In the investigation of bilateral FDI stocks, three new Member States are also contained in the sample (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), but here only the years 1998 and 1999 are considered. Kox et al. take the commercial services sector as an aggregate, where only those sectors are covered that are affected by the SD ("transport" and "travel", which together make up some 50 percent of total trade in services are excluded).
According to the results of the latest version of the study, the implementation of the SD would have the following effects: (1) Intra-EU trade in services increases by 44 percent (range: 30-62 percent with an average of +44 percent), 19 and (2) Intra-EU FDI in services increase by 26 percent (range: 18-36 percent with an average of +26 percent). The trade results are of similar magnitude in later CPB studies by Gelauff and Lejour and by Bruijn et al. 20 (3b) Gelauff and Lejour with the Worldscan model of CPB -a static general equilibrium world model covering 19 EU countries explicitly, the Rest EU, USA, Rest OECD, Non-OECD and 12 sectors four of which are service sectors (transport services, other commercial services, research and development and other services) -study "Five Lisbon highlights" (the internal market for services, the reduction of administrative burdens, goals on improving human capital, the 3% target on research and development expenditures, and 70% target on the employment rate). The implementation of the DSD 2004 leads to an increase in real GDP in 2025 of cumulative 0.2 percentage points for the EU (+0.4 percent for Austria). The overall employment effect is zero in this static CGE model. However, there are some reallocations between the 12 sectors used 19 Intra-EU trade covers approximately half of total trade in services.
Consequently, the estimated effect on total trade in services is half of the effects given above. In terms of total intra-EU trade (including goods), the estimated effect corresponds to an increase by 2 to 5 percent. Out of total trade (goods and services) of the EU, only 20 percent consists of trade in services. The structure of trade in services (data as of 2003) is as follows: 33% is tourism/travel, 31% business services, 18% is transport, 10% financial services, 3% telecommunication, 2% each is construction and government services and 1% is private services. 20 Gelauff and Lejour (2006), Bruijn et al. (2006). in the model (with negative employment effects in the sector "other commercial services").
(3c) Bruijn et al.
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, also using the Worldscan model, study the implications of the DSD 2004 (inclusive CoOP) and the SD 2006 (excluding the CoOP). In the original version the SD would result in an increase of real GDP in 2025 of +0.3 to 0.7 percentage points (again with zero overall employment effects). Excluding the CoOP would reduce the effects by 1/3 to an increase of real GDP of +0.2 to 0.4 percentage points.
(4) In an econometric study by Breuss and Badinger 22 using a cross-section and panel approach, the implementation of the DSD 2004 is estimated to result in the creation of on average 612,000 new jobs and an increase in real GDP by 0.7 percent. These effects -as all those of the other studies -apply only in the medium to the long-run. The methodology and the results of this study are explained in the following sections.
IV. Econometric Estimation of the Trade Channel Effects of the Services Directive
The following sections describe the empirical analysis, the data used, the econometric methodology applied and the simulations of the macro-economic impact of an implementation of the SD. The results are based on Breuss and Badinger (2006) 
A. The Implications for Competition and Productivity
1 . D a t a S o u r c e s a n d C o u n t r y C o v e r a g e Our data set draws on several sources. Data except those on trade were taken and derived from the 60-Industry Database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC, 2005) as well as from the Structural Analysis (STAN) Database of the OECD. The latter source was particularly important for obtaining 21 Bruijn et al. (2006) . 22 Breuss and Badinger (2006) . 23 For a detailed discussion of the changes from a legal perspective the see contribution by Griller and Maydell to this volume (chapter XXX).
investment data needed to calculate investment ratios, capital stocks (and to derive estimates for mark-ups). Trade data were taken exclusively from the Statistics on International Trade in Services database of the OECD. As far as country coverage is concerned, our initial approach was to use the EU-25, of course; it turned out, however, that even four of the EU-15 countries had to be excluded due to missing data (Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Portugal). For several specifications, particularly those requiring data on mark-ups, the cross-section dimension had to be further reduced since not all countries have data for real investment in all industries considered.
24 Nevertheless, the coverage is large enough to regard our results as representative, at least for the EU-15, and to a smaller extent for the EU-25 as well. As control countries and to add observations, we also included Norway and the USA, two further OECD countries for which sufficient data were available. We checked the sensitivity of the results, when these two non-EU countries were excluded or when country dummies for the USA and Norway were used, and found that their inclusion makes no important difference to the results.
. I n d u s t r y C l a s s i f i c a t i o n a n d C o v e r a g e o f t h e S e r v i c e s D i r e c t i v e
We use the most detailed classification of service industries which our data sources permit. Restrictions are placed by all sources, also since the industry classifications used by the STAN and the GGDC data (International Standard of Industrial Classification) are not exactly the same as the one used in the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services (Extended Balance of Payments Services Classification). Fortunately, the correspondences 25 turned out to be close enough to obtain a reasonable sub-classification of the service sector into 13 detailed service industries. Table 3 gives a detailed overview of the composition of the EU-15's value added and employment by industry. Total services constitute 77 percent of value added or 78 percent of total employment. It should be added, however, that several service industries are not considered to be covered by the SD: these are typical non-market or government provided services (such as public administration, public defence, health and social work, etc.). Together these industries make up 23 percent of total value added (or 30 percent of total employment), leaving service industries totalling 54 percent of total value added (or 48 percent in terms of total employment) to be potentially covered by the SD. These industries, referred to as SI01 to SI13, constitute our most comprehensive sample.
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From this sample, however, not all industries will be covered. First, transport (SI04, SI05) is excluded from the SD; the same is true for financial services (SI07, SI08). We also exclude travel (SI03) (though it is largely covered by the SD) for two reasons: first, to make our sample as consistent as possible with the Kox et al. 27 study that excludes travel from the estimates (which we will use in the simulation); second, travel turns out to be an outlier in the sense that results change significantly when it is added to the sample. (The relevance of the sample choice will be discussed in greater detail below). Communication (SI06), which includes telecommunication and construction (SI01) are partly excluded from the SD.
When the study by Breuss and Badinger (2006) was carried out it was uncertain how the revision of the DSD 2004 would result in a narrowing of the coverage of sectors.
28 This uncertainty was handled by applying the "LEGO approach", that means starting from the most comprehensive sample including all industries, and then excluding, step by step, industries which are not covered (or not fully covered) by the SD until a sample remains which closely coincides with the SD 2006. The final industry classification and the samples used are given in table 4.
To give some impression of the relevance of the respective samples, table 2 shows the corresponding shares of the services industries contained in the samples in total value added and total employment. While we will use the "LEGO approach" and carry out the estimation for all samples, sample D, which is closest to both the study by Kox et al. and the coverage of the SD, is our preferred sample. (see table 2 ). Sample A does not include the industries in parentheses from table 2. 1) For SI03 ("Travel") no perfect correspondence could be achieved: trade data for SI03 include both hotels and restaurants as well as travel agencies, whereas SI03 for the other variables covers only hotels and restaurants (since activities of travel agencies and tour operators are only available aggregated with transport activities, and cannot be allocated accordingly).
. M e t h o d o l o g i c a l I s s u e s
Our empirical analysis can be divided into three classes of empirical models which are all similar in their structure and motivated by the transmission channels of the SD illustrated in figure 1 :
First, we explain competition (measured as mark-up ratio, i.e. the ratio of prices over marginal costs 29 ) by domestic market size (in terms of population) and trade (more precisely, the ratio of imports to production) to figure out the likely "pro-competitive effect" of the increase in trade triggered by the SD:
(1) Markup ik is related to trade, measured as ratio of imports to production (m) and country size, measured by population (Pop); i (k) refers to country (service industry). Obviously, imports are endogenous in (1), e.g. as a results of reverse causality. High markups may act as signals for profit opportunities and thus attract foreign competitors. We use the geographical share of the import ratio to instrument for imports in (1) as constructed in Badinger and Breuss (2005) -using a gravity model approach -to get a robustness check and to ensure that our least squares results are not driven by endogeneity (see below for a more detailed discussion).
Our second group of models investigates the link between productivity (measured in terms of value added per hour worked) and domestic market size and trade. This should help us to assess the first important channel of the SD, the direct effects of trade on productivity. The basic specification used is similar to the study by Frankel and Romer 30 who, however, use aggregate data and a large sample of countries. As far as the direct effects of trade on productivity are concerned, the results are disappointing. In contrast to aggregate estimates as in Frankel and Romer and industry 29 We calculate the country-and industry specific mark-up (Markup ik ) as the ratio of value added to the sum of capital costs and labour compensation according to: . Therefore this (direct) channel is omitted from our analysis. Instead we consider the indirect channel from competition to productivity, using:
(2) Productivity (Prod) measured by output per hour worked is related to competition (Markup) and market size (Pop).
The third group of models tries to examine the relation between economic performance (productivity, employment, investment) and market size and competition. These models are similar in spirit to the approach taken by Griffith and Harrison (2004) and follow the equation:
(3) Perform (macro-economic performance) is identified by three macro-economic variables: (i) Productivity (Prod), (ii) Employment (L), and (iii) Investment (sk = investment ratio).
Endogeneity is likely to be a problem in all models: trade is endogenous with respect to productivity and competition, and competition is likely to be endogenous with respect to performance (particularly productivity). Previous studies with similar specifications suggest that least squares estimates are not far off (or often tend to underestimate the effects). Nevertheless, we check the robustness of the results using instrumental variable (IV) techniques, thereby exploiting the exogeneity of geography. 33 The 31 Badinger and Breuss (2005) . 32 In a more recent attempt, Badinger and Breuss (2006) found a relationship between aggregate trade in services and productivity at the country level. 33 In particular, we use the fact that aggregate "proximity" of a country and industry is an important determinant of both trade and competition (through trade and threat of entry). Ideally, these proximity measures would be constructed from (industry-specific) geographical trade shares calculated from the estimates of bilateral gravity models including geographical variables only (as suggested by Frankel and Romer, 1999) . Such an approach was chosen in a similar setting for manufacturing industries by Badinger and Breuss (2005) . For service industries at the level of disaggregation used here, however, bilateral trade data are not available; hence, we use an auxiliary approach and construct the instruments for trade and competition for a sample of basic message of this exercise is that the least squares estimates are not misleading. We use two approaches: a cross-section approach referring to averages of the period 1995-2000, and a panel approach covering the period 1978-2002. The advantage of the cross-section approach is that it refers to more actual data and that geography-based (i.e. time-invariant) instruments can be used to address endogeneity concerns. Here, the advantage of the panel estimates lies in the use of much more observations; a disadvantage is that we are forced to rely on the least squares estimates; this is not too much of a problem, however, in light of the small differences between the least squares and the IV results in the cross-section analysis.
. E s t i m a t i o n R e s u l t s
As to the industry dimension, we always start from the most comprehensive sample A, including all industries, and then, step by step, exclude industries not covered by the SD until we arrive at sample D. The results in table A1 in the appendix report only the results for the preferred sample D.
As we did not find a significant direct relationship between trade and productivity for service sectors we endorse the indirect channel according to equation (1), namely between competition and productivity. The results are documented for Sample D in table A1 in the appendix (the last three columns).
Regarding the relationship between competition and economic performance, results correspond more closely to the theoretical presumptions. Table A1 in the appendix illustrates some key regression results, referring to sample D. The main results can be summarised as follows:
For our preferred sample D (see table 4) we can identify indirect effects of the SD on the economic performance via an increase in competition. We find both economically and statistically significant effects of trade on competition (mark-ups), and of competition on productivity, employment and investment. More trade leads to more competition (lower mark-ups) which is associated with higher productivity as well as higher employment, investment and output.
services industries from industry-specific proximity measures for manufacturing industries from Breuss and Badinger (2005) .
The IV results of our cross-section estimates tend to be higher than the least squares estimates. While the IV results should be treated with caution since only an auxiliary approach can be used for the construction of instruments, they nevertheless suggest that the least squares estimates are not fundamentally misleading.
The results of the least squares panel estimates are in line with the results from the cross-section models, though the panel results suggest a somewhat smaller magnitude of the effects.
As far as the relevance of the sample choice is concerned, it should be noted that the results are not completely robust for all samples given in table 3. As far as transport services are concerned, adding them to sample D hardly affects the results. This is not true for financial services; results are sensitive to adding this industry so that the results for sample D cannot be extended to financial services without qualification.
A further point that deserves some discussion is the exclusion of "travel" from our preferred sample. On principle, travel (including hotels and restaurants, catering, as well as activities of travel agencies and tour operators, tourist assistance activities) is covered by the SD, but we nevertheless excluded it from the estimation for two reasons: first, to make our industry coverage as consistent as possible with the study by Kox et al. who excluded travel as well; second, "travel" (SI03) turned out to be an outlier in the estimation in so far as the results changed significantly when travel was added to the estimation. There is no fully convincing explanation for this phenomenon: particularly pronounced measurement problems in this industry may be one explanation; another issue is that competition in travel industries exhibits several idiosyncratic characteristics (as the role of local, region-specific amenities); a further point (at least for the regressions including trade) is that for this particular industry there is only a rough correspondence between our trade and production data. Figure 2 illustrates our finding that the main channel through which the SD will contribute to macro-economic performance is an increase in competition. To obtain an assessment on the likely magnitude of these effects we need to quantify: (1) the likely
B. Simulation of the Macro-economic Implications of the Services Directive via the Trade Channel
SD
Competition Performance increase in competition as a result of the SD, and (2) the magnitude of the effects of competition on performance. 
. E f f e c t s o f t h e S e r v i c e s D i r e c t i v e o n C o m p e t i t i o n
As a benchmark estimate of the likely effects of the SD on competition, we use our estimation results for the link between imports and competition, together with the trade effects of the SD according to Kox et al. 34 As already mentioned above, they estimate that due to the implementation of the DSD 2004 the overall heterogeneity indicator will decline by 1/3 (see table 2) and this will increase intra-EU trade (in the industries covered by the SD) by 30 to 62 percent; in our simulation we focus on their central estimate of 44 percent. Note that our estimates refer to total rather than intra-EU trade. Since intra-EU trade in services accounts for around half of total trade in services, we assume that the SD will increase total trade in services by some 22 percent. 35 The average of our estimates for our preferred sample D (see table A1 in the appendix) suggests that an increase in imports by one percent reduces mark-ups by 0.127 percentage points.
This implies that an increase in trade (imports) by 22 percent will translate into an increase in competition, i.e. a reduction in mark-ups by some 2.5 percentage points. It should be borne in mind, however, that the SD will enhance competition not only through an increase in trade but also by making market entry easier and increasing the threat of entry. Against this background we interpret the mark-up reduction of 2.5 percentage points as a lower bound; as an upper bound we will use a mark-up reduction of 5 percentage points (which also corresponds to the effects obtained using the coefficient from the cross-section IV estimates). 36 As a central estimate for the simulation, we use a mark-up reduction by 3.75 percentage points.
. E f f e c t s o f C o m p e t i t i o n o n P r o d u c t i v i t y ,
E m p l o y m e n t , a n d I n v e s t m e n t Our estimates provide us with a range of coefficients for the effects of competition on productivity, employment and investment. Again, we focus on our preferred sample (D), but still we have three estimates: least squares and IV from the cross-section, and least squares from the panel. As a benchmark, we decided to use the average of the three estimates; as a consequence, the following coefficients are used in the simulation:
semi-elasticity between productivity and mark-ups: -0.214, semi-elasticity between employment and mark-ups: -0.225, semi-elasticity between investment and mark-ups: -0.145. Together with the assumed increase in competition (reduction in mark-ups) by 2.5 to 5 percentage points this will provide us with a range of estimates regarding the effects of the SD on productivity, employment, investment and value added.
. S i m u l a t i o n R e s u l t s o f t h e E c o n o m i c I m p a c t o f D S D 2 0 0 4
Table 5 summarises the results of the simulation for the EU as a whole. Note that our estimation is carried out only for eleven EU countries due to limited data availability, but throughout we calculate the results for the EU-15 and EU-25 countries, too. The simulation suggests that in the service industries considered (sample D, see table 4), productivity in terms of value added per hour worked will go up by 0.53 to 1.07 percent (central estimate: 0.80 percent), employment by 0.56 to 1.13 percent (central estimate: 0.85 percent). Taken together, this implies an increase in value added by 1.10 to 2.20 percent (central estimate: 1.65 percent). The investment ratio is predicted to rise by 0.36 to 0.73 percentage points (central estimate: 0.55 percentage points). , employment in service industries of the EU-11 is predicted to increase by some 485,000 persons, or by 515,000 persons in the EU-15: extrapolating the results to the EU-25 using the ratio of aggregate employment in the EU-25 to aggregate employment in the EU-15 (1.19), the predicted increase in employment for the EU-25 amounts to 612,000 persons. Table 6 shows the absolute changes in employment by country based on the central estimates.
Comparing our aggregate estimates with the CGE simulations by Copenhagen Economics 37 , we find surprisingly similar results. The estimated increase in employment by Copenhagen Economics amounts to around 600,000 persons, which is very close to our central estimates for the EU-25; the increase in value added in service industries according to Copenhagen Economics amounts to 1.1 percent, which is also in the range of our estimates. The same pro-competitive effect is assumed for each country here, i.e. the variation is only due to the different levels of employment in sample D across countries.
There is no reason to assume that changes in competition have fundamentally different effects across countries. This was also confirmed when trying to estimate country-specific coefficients for competition in the models for productivity, employment and investment, which yielded implausible results. However, the SD is likely to have different effects on the degree of competition in the EU countries, depending on the current level of regulation and regulation heterogeneity in the respective country. Kox et al. (2004 Kox et al. ( /2005 calculate country-specific changes of their regulation heterogeneity indices and use them to simulate country-specific effects of the SD on trade in services. Countries with a higher level of regulation (or more heterogeneity with respect to the other EU countries) will experience a larger opening up of markets and hence larger trade effects.
It is plausible to assume that the increase in imports relative to the EU average (implied by the country-specific estimates in Kox et al. 38 is a good indicator for the increase in market access due to the SD relative to the EU average and thus for the increase in competition relative to the EU average. Table 7 shows the implied country-specific effects of the SD on productivity, employment, value added, investment and absolute employment, each of them based on the central estimate. Above average winners are Portugal, Denmark, Greece, Austria, and Italy; the effects in Germany, Spain, Finland, and France correspond roughly to the average EU effects, while Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom gain less than the EU average. This is not a new result, of course, but an implication shared with the Kox et al. study.
It should be added that these figures are "bottom-line" results; potential reallocations between industries and countries are not investigated here. In particular, the fear of trade unions that the SD could lead to "social dumping" is not addressed in our study. On the one hand, the huge disparities in wage costs (roughly 1:10) could lead to an unbeatable comparative advantage of service providers from the new EU Member States of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the old EU countries have a much stronger competitive edge in providing services when it comes to quality competition. Relative pro-competitive effect of the SD in the respective country corresponding to the relative trade effects estimated by Kox et al. (2005, p. 43) . Since Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as aggregate in the study by Kox et al. (2004 Kox et al. ( /2005 , we assume the same value for both countries. The aggregate value for the EU does not correspond to the sum of country values due to mechanics of aggregation and averaging.
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V. Econometric Estimation of the FDI Channel of the Services Directive
As figure 1 illustrates there are two channels via which the reduction of regulation might relieve the cross-border provision of services: (i) via the principle of "Free movement of services" (SD 2006) implying more Intra-EU trade, more competition and hence a better macro-economic performance (see section IV) and (ii) via the principle of "Freedom of establishment for services providers" leading to more Intra-EU FDI flows.
In this chapter we deal with the second channel, the impact of the SD on foreign direct investment (FDI). This channel is not dealt with explicitly in the previous studies (see table 1), neither in the CGE model of Copenhagen Economics nor in the Worldscan model of the CPB. However, Kox et al. 40 estimate econometrically that the reduction of policy-heterogeneity by 1/3 would lead to an increase in Intra-EU-FDI stocks by 18-36 % (with an average of +26%). The aim of this chapter is to quantify directly the effects of regulations for FDI on FDI activity in services industries and furthermore to estimate the resulting impact on productivity.
We assume that FDI regulations affect all foreign investors in the same way, irrespective of their residences. Thus we do not include an index for heterogeneity as suggested by Kox et al. in our estimations but the FDI regulation index constructed by Golub 41 . As bilateral data on FDI flows or stocks are not (or at least not sufficiently) available at the industry level, we use an aggregate approach rather than a traditional bilateral gravity-type model. We follow a two step procedure: First, we estimate the impact of regulation on FDI stocks. Second, we relate productivity on FDI stocks to derive the macro-economic impact of SD's "Freedom of establishment for services providers". Using our estimates we simulate the change in productivity resulting from a reduction in FDI regulations by 1/3.
A. The Implications on FDI and Productivity
. D a t a S o u r c e s a n d C o u n t r y C o v e r a g e
The data sources used to estimate the effects of the SD on foreign direct investment and the impact of the change in foreign direct investment on productivity include the 60-Industry Database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) as well as the International Direct Investment Statistics Database of the OECD. The latter was mainly used to obtain data on FDI inward stocks for the individual service sectors, while the GGDC database provided us with data on average labour productivity and value added. Due to poor data on FDI stocks only four service sectors and eleven countries could be included in our analysis. As can bee seen from table 8, the four sectors included cover 28.25 percent of the value added and 36.05 percent of employment of all industries of the EU-15 in the year 2002. The sample comprises 11 EU countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and United Kingdom (three of which are new EU member states and transformation economies -Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). In order to maximize sample size, averages over the years 2000 to 2002 were taken for every variable except the FDI regulation index. FDI barriers within the EU were measured by the "FDI restriction indices" by Golub, based on the years 1998 and 2000. The index incorporates regulations on how much foreign equity is allowed in a specific sector, screening and approval and other restrictions. As can be seen from figure 3, within the covered sample of the four sectors (1 = construction, 2 = distribution, 3 = hotels & restaurants, 4 = business services), Austria seems to have the most rigorous restrictions on FDI while the Netherlands have the most liberal regime in this respect. 
. M e t h o d o l o g i c a l I s s u e s
The main problem arising in the estimation is the possible endogeneity of FDI stocks. It seems likely that productivity itself is an explaining factor for FDI stocks. Unfortunately, due to absence of bilateral FDI data we were not able to construct instruments as suggested by Gao 42 . However, Gao and Frankel and Romer 43 found evidence that an ordinary least square estimation tends to underestimate the effects of FDI and trade on productivity. Therefore, we may assume that our OLS estimates are not misleading and may be interpreted with due care as a lower bound of the possible effect.
Our empirical analysis can be divided into two classes of empirical models which are similar in their structure (and also comparable to the approach for the analysis of the trade channel; see section IV). They are motivated by the transmission channels of the SD illustrated in figure 1 :
First, we relate foreign direct investment (FDI) to domestic market size (in terms of population) and regulation intensity for FDI::
where FDI ik is measured in terms of the inward FDI stock relative to value added (i denotes country and k industry); Reg ik are the indices for FDI restriction for industry k in country i, and Pop i is population of country i. The industry specific constants are allowed to differ between the transition (T) and non-transition economies (NT), to account for the fact that the transformation economies in Eastern Europe experienced a huge inflow of FDI in the 1990s (well above the "normal" FDI flows between industrial countries).
The second group of models tries to identify the impact of FDI on productivity using a specification similar to the one suggested by Gao 44 . He finds a significant positive effect of FDI-stock-to-GDPratio on real GDP per worker for a sample of non-oil producing developing countries. We depart from this specification in three respects. As in equation (2), productivity is defined as value added per hour worked; population is used as only control variable; and industry-specific constants are included, which are again allowed to differ between transition and non-transition economies.
. E s t i m a t i o n R e s u l t s
After removing one outlier (the Greek business services industry) from our sample, results for equation (4) are quite satisfactory and robust to changes in the specification. The second column in table A2 in the appendix shows the summary of the cross-section estimation results. Our preferred specification includes only Reg and Pop as explanatory variables, consistent with the analysis of the trade channel. Aggregate measures of area, distance and language did not enter the empirical models at conventional significance levels.
On average, countries of the EU-15 have higher FDI inward stocks than transition countries, although only one constant term is significant at a 10 percent level (the interaction between the transition and the construction industry dummy, not displayed in table A2). Population, which serves as a control variable for size effects, has a negative effect on FDI inward stocks ratio, significant at a 5 percent level. On average, smaller countries are not only more open in terms of trade but attract also greater FDI stocks relative to value added than larger ones.
Turning to row 4 in table A2, we find an negative relation between the FDI inward stock ratio and the indices for FDI regulation. Since the Golub regulation index is inversely defined, reducing barriers to FDI by one percentage point in the service market leads to an increase in the ratio of FDI inward stocks to value added by 0.45 percent. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The third column in table A2 reports the estimation results of equation (5), relating average labour productivity (Prod) to FDI and market size. In contrast to equation (4), results are not that robust to changes in the specification. Different factors explaining productivity (R&D ratio, capital labour ratio and labour compensation) have been included and tested along with FDI inward stocks, the central factor of our study. When estimating with UNCTAD FDI flow data, no significant effects of FDI on productivity can be found. The same is true when R&D ratios are included along with OECD FDI inward stocks. However, leaving aside R&D ratios, a marginally significant (10 percent level) positive impact of the FDI ratio on average labour productivity can be found. A 1 percent increase in the ratio of FDI inward stock relative to value added improves productivity by 0.15 percent. In the equation for the estimation of average labour productivity, population has a significant and positive impact. Finally, average productivity levels are significantly smaller in the three transition countries of our sample.
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B. Simulation of the Macro-economic Implications of the Services Directive via the FDI Channel
We used the coefficient for FDI regulation of equation (4) and FDI inward stocks of equation (5) to simulate effects of the SD on FDI inward stocks and productivity, based on the assumption that its implementation leads to a reduction in barriers to FDI by 1/3 (the reduction in policy heterogeneity as a result of the SD according to Kox et al. 45 ). Figure 4 illustrates the channel through which the services directive may influence performance in terms of productivity. According to our estimates, the reduction of the barriers to FDI in service industries (Reg) by one third implies an increase in FDI inward stocks in the four observed services industries by 18.9 percent. These results are comparable to the lower bound estimates of Kox et al. (2004 Kox et al. ( /2005 , but as argued above the OLS estimates are likely to underestimate the effects.
This 18.9 percent increase in FDI inward stocks translates into an increase in average labour productivity by 2.8 percent. Assuming that the Services Directive does not affect the industries excluded from the sample (some 72 percent of value added), aggregate total productivity gains amount to 0.80 percent. Note, however, that these effects rely on calculations of Kox et al. assuming the implementation of the DSD 2004.
Economic theory on employment effects of FDI is ambiguous. Several trial regression, relating employment to FDI and including standard controls, did not yield robust results. We do not pursue this issue further here and assume that the stimulation of FDI via die implementation of the SD only leads to productivity and hence production effects. From the increase of productivity and zero employment growth one can deduce that the implementation of the DSD 2004 would lead to an increase in real GDP by 0.80 percent. An evaluation of how much the change from the CoOP to the CoDP affects the "Policy heterogeneity indices" or the "Indices of FDI restrictions" is very difficult. The SD 2006 involves a lot of exception clauses, allowing EU Member States to make restrictions only for reasons of public policy, public security, public health or the protection of the environment. How much EU Member States 46 Copenhagen Economics (2005b). 47 Bruijn et al. (2006) . will make use of such restrictions and how much of them will pass the newly introduced "screening process" (Art. 41(5)) by the European Commission is an open question.
VI. Which Change in the Macro
We therefore rely on the assumption that the watering down of the DSD 2004 by the SD 2006 will reduce liberalization effects by 1/3. This translates into a proportionate reduction of the macroeconomic effects, because it reduces both the old an new EU Member States potential to exploit their respective comparative advantages. The corresponding results are given in table 9.
VII. Policy Implications and Conclusions
Making the EU's Single Market more dynamic has been identified as one of the top priorities to improve the EU's growth performance. While the Single Market in manufacturing appears to be working quite well, there are still many impediments to the free movement of services in the Internal Market. Particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises, the bulk of service providers, entry barriers in new EU markets are often prohibitive. The Internal Market for Services should have been working since its inception in 1993. However, already seven years later in March 2000 on the summit of the European Council in Lisbon the heads of state or government had to conclude that in reality it did not. In the context of the "Lisbon strategy" it therefore asked the European Commission to design a global "Single Market Strategy" to make the Single Market working properly. A comprehensive report on the existing administrative and regulatory hurdles in the EU Member This study builds on previous work on the economic impact of the SD (Copenhagen Economics, Kox et al. 49 ) and investigates its 48 See European Commission (2002) . 49 Copenhagen Economics (2005a), Kox et al. (2004 Kox et al. ( /2005 economic implications using an alternative approach. In particular, we use a simple partial econometric framework to estimate the effects of the reduction in regulation due to the implementation of the SD via two channels: (i) via the trade channel and (ii) via the FDI channel.
Ad (i): Trade channel: More trade leads to more competition which is associated with higher productivity, higher employment, investment and output. Based on previous estimates of the trade effects of the SD by Kox et al., and recognising that the SD increases competition also via easier market entry by reducing the start-up costs of firms, we assume that the SD leads to a reduction in mark-ups (in terms of value added) by 2.5 to 5 percentage points; this is smaller than the mark-up reductions in manufacturing due to the Single Market according to the estimates of Badinger 50 . Using this range of effects of the DSD 2004 on competition, we estimate its effects on productivity, employment, investment and value added. Results suggest that productivity in the service industries covered by the SD increases by 0.80 percent, employment by 0.85 percent (or by 612,000 persons in terms of the EU-25), and the investment ratio by 0.55 percentage points. Value added of the services covered will go up by 1.65 percent, which corresponds to an aggregate GDP effect of 0.7 percent. The elimination of the CoOP will reduce these effects by 1/3. All these effects, however, have to be understood as potentials, realised in the medium and long term.
Ad (ii): FDI channel: In contrast to other studies, we also explicitly analyse the impact of a reduction of regulations on FDI and the relationship from FDI to productivity. Regarding the productivity effects, we reach similar results in magnitude as for the trade channel.
Taking (i) and (ii) together we reach the following overall macro-economic effects of the SD 2006 for the EU-25: Employment will increase by around 400.000 persons and GDP increases by around 1 percent.
Some words of caution are advisable here: First, it should be noted that the results are not completely robust across all specifications, when additional service industries are included. Particularly sensitive industries turn out to be travel (covered by the SD) and financial services (not covered by the SD). There is no 50 Badinger (2006) . straightforward explanation for this discrepancy. While the choice of the preferred sample is well motivated and corresponds most closely to that used in previous studies and the coverage of the SD, this remains a qualification to our results which has to be borne in mind.
Second, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to the magnitude of the effects; this is not only true for the trade effects estimated by Kox et al. with a range from 30 to 62 percent, whose central estimate of 44 percent we use to get a benchmark estimate of the magnitude of the SD's pro-competitive effect. It should also be emphasised that our estimated coefficients regarding the effects of competition on productivity, employment and investment used in the simulation are point estimates with sizeable confidence intervals.
It is, however, reassuring that the evaluation of the SD with completely different methods (ours rely on a simple partial econometric approach; Copenhagen Economics and CPB apply comprehensive world CGE models) leads to quite similar conclusions concerning the magnitude of the effects on major macro-economic variables. 2) Panel estimates are pooled estimates with industry dummies and time-specific fixed effects included and refer to period 1978-2002 (for longest time series).
3)
Average of industry-specific constants. *** Significant at 1 percent; ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. T-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. Pop denotes population; m is the ratio of imports to production. Productivity is measured in value added per hour worked. L denotes total employment in persons. Investment is measured as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation over value added. Mark-ups is the ratio of prices over marginal costs. All variables except the investment ratio and the mark-up ratio are in natural logs. For more details on the estimation, see Breuss and Badinger (2005) . 
